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COMMENTS
STOCKHOLDER REALIZATION OF CORPORATE EARNINGS
AND THE INCOME TAX
The rate discrimination between capital gains and ordinary income and the
phenomenon of the corporate entity result in unsolved problems of inequity and
avoidance in federal income taxation of individual shareholder's realizations of
corporate earnings. The shareowner's tax too frequently depends upon the
manner in which he receives his corporation's earnings, rather than upon the
amount of earnings he receives. The stockholder's undivided interest in ac-
cumulated corporate profits may be converted into cash in his hands in one or
more steps inyolving any of several transactions. These transactions may be
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roughly classified as: (i) cash and property dividends, (2) sales of stock by
shareholders, (3) complete liquidations, (4) partial liquidations,, (5) recapitali-
zations, (6) reorganizations involving more than one corporation, 2 (7) exchanges
of like kinds of stock, and (8) stock dividends, including stock rights. Apart from
tax considerations, in nearly every situation the employment of either of two or
more of the means enumerated will produce substantially the same result to the
stockholder.3 The result to the shareholder can be the same in terms of receipts
of cash representing realization of corporate profits, retention of proportionate
interest in assets and future earnings of the corporation, and maintenance of
control of the corporation. Inequity is present wherever substantially similar
tax results do not also follow, regardless of the method employed. Avoidance is
invited wherever a shareholder or group of shareholders can choose, on the basis
of differing tax consequences, among various methods of effecting the same
economic result. Consequently, in converting corporate profits into share-
holders' receipts, avoidance is accomplished chiefly in closely held corporations,
where the stockholders' potential tax liabilities are most likely to direct the cor-
poration's transactions. Even as among closely held corporations, there may be
inequity in that shareholders' avoidance opportunities may depend upon the
fortuitous circumstance of capital structure complexity.
The immediate tax result in transactions leading to realization of corporate
profits is a legislative or judicial determination that the transaction is a taxable
dividend or that it is a capital adjustment. This decision may determinein whole
or in part the ultimate tax result in respect to the shareholder's investment. The
ultimate tax result is the answer to two questions: (x) whether the corporate
profits realized will be taxed to the shareholder at ordinarjincome rates or at
capital gain rates or not at all;4 (2) whether or not the taxpayer will be able to
choose the year or years in which the profits realized are taxed to him, so as to
make the most of varying rates and fluctuating income. The significance of
these questions to the stockholder underlines the inequity and the opportunity
for avoidance involved if transactions with a similar economic effect on the tax-
, The terms "complete liquidations" and "partial liquidations" here refer to liquidations of
corporations rather than of stockholders' investments.
2 This type of reorganization is not considered in the comparisons made in this note.
3 From the viewpoint of the corporate enterprise, less relevant here, a choice among two or
more of the transactions listed will often be available to produce a similar result with no con-
trolling nontax considerations favoring a particular alternative. The nontax considerations
may be relatively unimportant or balanced in advantages and disadvantages among alterna-
tives. To the extent that a given shareholder controls the corporation's choice, opportunity for
avoidance is present if tax effects do not change with changing economic effects to the share-
holder. When a shareholder does not control the corporation's choice because of hislack of con-
trol of the corporation or because the choice is dictated by nontax influences, inequity remains
if, as between him and other taxpayers whose corporations employ other methods, similar eco-
nomic results occasion different tax results.
4 Capital gain rates: Int. Rev. Code § i7, 26 U.S.C.A. § 117 ('945); not at all, because of
the loophole provided by the basis change at death: Int. Rev. Code § 113(a) (5), 26 U.S.C.A.
§ I13(a)(5) (1945).
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payer result in differing tax effects. The following inquiry will show that they
often do.
The shareholder's interest in the accumulated earnings6 of his corporation
may be changed into cash in one step or several. The simplest one-step means
of realization are cash dividends and sales of stock to other stockholders or to
strangers to the enterprise. The tax consequences of these transactions are well
settled, but the difference in consequences is not an entirely reasonable differ-
ence. Thus, the holder of shares which have increased in market value since
acquisition because of the accumulation of earnings by the corporation may
realize the increment in his investment through the sale of his stock, altogether
or a share at a time, at capital gain rates.7 But if he realizes his interest in cor-
porate earnings through the receipt of cash dividends, which, of course, have an
effect similar to that produced by a sale of shares one at a time, the tax will be at
ordinary income rates.8 This difference in tax treatment can not be defended by
pointing to stockholders who can not or will not sell their shares. Possible limits
on marketability do not exist in many cases-for example, when the stock is
listed on an exchange. The interest of some stockholders in control can not be
used as an argument when, for instance, the stock is nonvoting common. The
desire of some shareholders to retain their investment in a given enterprise does
not justify favoring speculators over stable investors. Moreover, even granting
the frequent presence of these deterrents to the sale of shares, the force of the
argument based upon them is dissipated at its only possible point of applica-
tion-when the sale is made. Nor is the sharpness of the tax distinction between
cash dividends and sales of stock significantly modified by the market, for it is
highly unlikely that the sale price of the shares will often reflect the seller's tax
savings in even a roughly commensurate adjustment downward. 9
Even though the bargain rates on capital gains are preserved in other areas,
their retention in the field of shareholder realizations of corporate profits does
not clearly follow. Gain on the sale of land may result from inflation, the de-
velopment of the surrounding area, or many other factors, but it will include no
element of past earnings from the productive use of the land. Gain on the sale
5 The comparisons which follow assume that the corporation involved is a relatively normal
enterprise actually engaged in business activities. Problems involving personal holding com-
panies, corporations established solely for tax purposes, sales of property by a sole stockholder
to his alter ego to take a loss, and other abuse of the corporate entity are not within the scope
of this note.
6 "Earnings or profits" problems are not here discussed. Each example supposes a corpora-
tion with "earnings or profits accumulated after February 28, I913, or... earnings or profits
of the taxable year," Int. Rev. Code § ii5(a), 26 U.S.C.A. § ii5(a) (1945), sufficient to cover
the distribution in question, or that the corresponding requirements in Int. Rev. Code
§ iiS(g) or § 112(c)(2) have been met.
7Int. Rev. Code §§ iii, I12(a), 113, 117, 26 U.S.C.A. §§ ii, i12(a), 113, 117 (1945).
9 Int. Rev. Code §§ 22(a), ii5(a), 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 22(a), ix5(a) (1945).
9 Not only because of the lack of buyers (and sellers) informed as to the tax consequences
of particular sales of stock, but also because the seller's tax saving is not necessarily the buy-
er's tax loss. Text at notes 91-94 infra.
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of corporate shares, or the other hand, will very often represent past undistrib-
uted profits from the productive use of the capital symbolized by the stock. The
interposition of the corporate entity permits the easy transformation of operat-
ing profits (including rent) into capital gains for the stockholder. This feat is
not readily accomplished by the owners of other capital assets. The tax dif-
ference between cash dividends and sales of stock is doubly anomalous, for it
involves not only the present system's general discrimination between capital
gains and ordinary income, but also the opportunity to change normal, re-
curring profits into capital gains. Since these two transactions are the poles be-
tween which other shareholder realizations appear, the possible futility of any
attempt at substantial equity as to the intermediate types, or at establishment
of a workable set of rules for them, is suggested at once.10
From the stockholder's viewpoint, the complete liquidation of a corporation
is very much like a sale of his stock, and it is so treated, the stockholder conse-
quently realizing only a capital gain, regardless of the amount of accumulated
profits thereby distributed to him." The comparison between complete liquida-
tion and cash dividends is obvious enough, and has resulted in the collapsible
corporation, organized in anticipation of liquidation and resultant shareholder
realization of profits without dividend taxation.,' Even when this phenomenon
is disregarded, little justification appears for the contrast in tax results-be-
tween liquidation and cash dividends-in the case of a normal corporation com-
ing to a natural end, unless it be the law's lack of an effective averaging sys-
tem.13 The difference between capital gains and ordinary income still depends
10 However, there may still be some value in drawing the line at approximately the same
place in each of the intermediate cases.
11 Int. Rev. Code § ii5(c), 26 U.S.C.A. § xii(c) (i945). Nor does Section ir5(g) (text at
note 20 infra) apply to complete liquidations. Treas. Reg. III, § 29.115-9 (1946). A complete
liquidation will often involve a series of distributions over a period of more than one taxable
year. There is conflicting authority as to how the gain or loss should be computed, but the
method apparently preferred is the application of each distribution against the stockholder's
aggregate basis, with no gain recognized until the total basis has been exhausted, irrespective
of the stockholder's surrender of a few shares at the time of each distribution. Alvina Ludorff,
40 B.T.A. 32 (x939) (rejecting taxpayer's attempt to use installment basis as in installment
sales); Florence M. Quinn, 35 B.T.A. 412 (1937) (rejecting computation of gain or loss on each
distribution on basis of shares turned in). Contra: Courtenay D. Allington, 31 B.T.A. 421
(1934).
"2 Such as the one-movie corporation. See Armstrong, Shall We Have a Clifford Doctrine for
Corporations?, 24 Taxes 83o (1946). The chameleon type of enterprise, which may make sev-
eral successive changes from corporation to partnership and back again, may be somewhat
deterred by the possible inclusion of good will value in determining the gain on corporate
liquidation. Shelton, Stockholder's Gain on the Liquidation of a Corporation When There is
Good Will, in New York University Seventh Annual Institute on Federal Taxation 349 (1949).
13 This might be argued as a possible justification for the result in the case of sales of stock
also, and, indeed, for the entire capital gains section. But the argument is much less a justifica-
tion for this discrimination than an admission that such an averaging system is required.
Moreover: "With the six-months holding period in effect, there is no basis for the argument
that the special treatment of capital gains is a substitute for the averaging of income received
over a period of years." Blough, Where Is the Income Tax Heading?, in New York University
Seventh Annual Institute on Federal Taxation 8oo, 8o3 (1949).
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upon whether the earnings of the enterprise have been distributed or accumu-
lated prior to the liquidation. The rewards for liquidating are even more al-
luring when one considers the possibility, through distributions in kind, of
avoiding tax to the corporation on the sale of capital assets which have in-
creased in value during corporate ownership,14 with the possible added touch of
converting potential profits to the corporation on inventories or contracts into
mere capital gains for the shareholders.' s
Stock redemptions ("partial liquidations" in the language of the Code)' 6 may
resemble either cash dividends or complete liquidations in their economic effect
on the shareholder. If the stockholder's ownership interest in the corporation is
entirely terminated by the redemption, he is in a position similar to that of one
who has sold all of his shares. If stock has been redeemed pro rata among all the
stockholders, so that the proportionate interest of each in the assets and earn-
ings of the corporation is unchanged, the effect can hardly be distinguished from
that of a cash dividend. Accordingly, in the former situation the taxpayer will
be treated as though he had sold his shares," while in the latter case he will gen-
erally be considered as having received a taxable dividend. 8 If the basic simi-
4 if the corporation sells the assets and then distributes the proceeds to the stockholders (in
liquidation), the corporation will be taxed on the capital gain resulting from the excess of the
selling price over the basis of the assets to the corporation, and the stockholders will be taxed
on the capital gain resulting from the excess of the amount received in liquidation over the
basis of their shares. If the corporation distributes the assets in kind to the stockholders, and
the stockholders then sell the assets, the tax to the corporation is avoided. But negotiations
prior to the liquidation may nevertheless result in the imposition of both levies. Comm'r v.
Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945); The Liquidation of Corporate Ownership Interests-
A Federal Tax Problem, 14 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 647 (r947); Freeland, Recent Trends in the
Court Holding Company Principle, in New York University Seventh Annual Institute on
Federal Taxation 369 (1949).
Is Income in x943 from oil brokerage contracts, which had no ascertainable fair market
value when received in complete liquidation of a corporation in 1942, was held to be long term
capital gain in Comm'r v. Carter, 170 F. 2d 9ii (C.C.A. 2d, 1948). This suggests transactions
like the following one: A corporation, about to be liquidated, holdslarge inventories, the sale of
which would result in income to the corporation which would not be subject to the capital gains
limitation in Int. Rev. Code § 117(c)(I). If the inventories are sold for a percentage of the
future profits of a successor enterprise or for some other contingent consideration, the consider-
ation may have no ascertainable market value at the time of the sale or at the time of the
liquidation. It may therefore be possible to eliminate the corporate tax and to spread the stock-
holder's gain on the liquidation. Brodsky, Planning Business Transactions to Produce Capital
Gains, in New York University Seventh Annual Institute on Federal Taxation 302, 306-309
(1949). But cf. Jud Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Comm'r, 153 F. 2d 681 (C.C.A. 5 th, 1946)
(construction contracts).
6The Code defines a distribution in partial liquidation as "a distribution by a corporation
in complete cancellation or redemption of a part of its stock, or one of a series of distributions
in complete cancellation or redemption of all or a portion of its stock." Int. Rev. Code § 1 i5(i),
26 U.S.C.A. § iis(i) (i945). "[Olne of a series of distributions in complete cancellation or re-
demption of all ... of [a corporation's] stock" could be more aptly described as part of a com-
plete liquidation, and it is so treated, not being subjected to Section II(g). Treas. Reg. III,
§ 29.115-9 (1946).
x7 Treas. Reg. III, § 29. 115-9 (I946)-
"8 Flanagan v. Helvering, ii6 F. 2d 937 (App. D.C., 194o); Treas. Reg. iiI, § 29.II5-9
(1946).
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larity between the seller of shares and the recipient of a cash dividend (as to
realization of corporate earnings)19 is disregarded, these two cases are easily
understandable. When the analogies are not so clear, it becomes more difficult to
apply the partial liquidation sections of the statute, which provide in Section
15(g) that where the redemption is effected "at such time and in such manner
as to make ... [it] in whole or in part essentially equivalent to the distribution
of a taxable dividend," it will be so treated.'0 As might be expected, the courts
have used a variety of criteria, sometimes conflicting, in applying this provi-
sion.2 Perhaps the most important factor pointing toward the analogy of a com-
plete liquidation has been a definite contraction of the business of the corpora-
tion which resulted in the redemption of shares. ' The wavering line thus drawn
'9 Text at notes 7-1o supra.
21 Int. Rev. Code § Ixs(g), 26 U.S.C.A. § xis(g) (1945).
11 Factors which have been considered significant as leading toward the conclusion that the
distribution was essentially equivalent to a dividend include: (i) The corporation accumulated
large earnings and distributed relatively few cash dividends. Flanagan v. Helvering, xi6 F. 2d
937 (App. D.C., I94O); Stein v. United States, 62 F. Supp. 568 (Ct. Cl., i945); William H.
Grimditch, 37 B.T.A. 402 (1938); J. Natwick, 36 B.T.A. 866 (1937). (2) The distribution did
not change the proportionate interests of the shareholders. Wall v. United States, 164 F. 2d
462 (C.C.A. 4th, 1947); Kirschenbaum v. Comm'r, 155 F. 2d 23 (C.C.A. 2d, 1946), cert. den.
329 U.S. 726 (1946); authorities cited note 18 supra. (3) The corporation manifested no con-
traction of business. Authorities cited note 22 infra. (4) The taxpayer controlled the corpora-
tion. Bertram Meyer, 5 T.C. i65 (I945), rev'd on other grounds 154 F. 2d 55 (C.C.A. 3d, 1946);
United National Corp., 2 T.C. ii (z943); PearlB. Brown, 26 B.T.A. 9o (1932), aff'd 69 F. 2d
602 (C.C.A. 7 th, 1934), cert. den. 293 U.S. 570 (1934). But cf. L. M. Lockhart, 8 T.C. 436(1947) (sole stockholder of corporation which had never declared a dividend).
The absence of a precise pro rata distribution will not avoid dividend treatment. W. & K.
Holding Corp., 38 B.T.A. 830 (1938); James D. Robinson, 27 B.T.A. ioi8 (1933), aff'd 69 F. 2d
972 (C.C.A. 5th, 1934). Nor can the section be avoided by holding the shares in the corporate
treasury. Cancellation is not a prerequisite. Wall v. United States, supra, at 465; James D.
Robinson, supra. But cf. Comm'r v. Snite, 177 F. 2d 819, 823 (C.A. 7th, 1949). The absence
of a plan on issuance of the shares to redeem them later in avoidance of dividend taxation will
not prevent the application of Section 1IS(g). Kirschenbaum v. Comm'r, supra, at 24 (overrul-
ing prior cases); Smith v. United States, 121 F. 2d 692, 695-96 (C.C.A. 3d, 194); Stein v.
United States, supra, at 573. But if the redemption was dictated by the needs of the corporate
business, it will probably escape dividend treatment. Fred B. Snite, io T.C. 523 (1948), aff'd
Comm'r v. Snite, supra (stock purchased by corporation for transfer to employees who sought
interest in business); Samuel A. Upham, 4 T.C. 120 (1945) (plan to eventually liquidate cor-
poration and turn over business to employees); Georgia P. Johnson, 6 T.C.M. 633, 641 (1947);
cf. cases cited note 22 infra. It has been suggested that "perhaps the section coversall cancella-
tions or redemptions which result in the distribution of accumulated earnings." Kirschenbaum
v. Comm'r, supra, at 24. But this is, at leastas yet, not the case. Comm'r v. Suite, supra, at 822.
In general, see Gutkin and Beck, Stock Redemptions as Taxable Events Under Section 115(g),
24 Taxes 1172 (1946); Crown, Essentially Equivalent to the Distribution of a Taxable Divi-
dend, 25 Taxes 146 (1947).
- Comm'r v. Babson, 7o F. 2d 3o4 (C.C.A. 7 th, 1934), cert. den. 293 U.S. 571 (1934);
Joseph W. Imler, ii T.C. 836 (1948); Samuel A. Upham, 4 T.C. 1120 (1945); Heber Scowcroft
Investment Co., 4 T.C.M. 755 (1945); Danzig, Distributions in Liquidations and Reorganiza-
tions, 26 Taxes 645 (948). On the other hand, the absence of a shrinkage in the business of the
corporation in correspondence with the redemption has been a significant factor toward hold-
ing the redemption taxable as a dividend. Rheinstrom v. Conner, 125 F. 2d 790 (C.C.A. 6th,
1942), cert. den. 317 U.S. 654 (1942); Flanagan v. Helvering, 1i6 F. 2d 937 (App. D.C., 194o);
Stein v. United States, 62 F. Supp. 568 (Ct. Cl., 1945); United National Corp., 2 T.C. ixx
(1943).
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between taxable dividends and capital adjustments is, in general, defensible
once the basic premises-the differing tax consequences of cash dividends and
sales of stock-are granted.2 3 But the legal structure built around Section 115(g)
may be entirely forgotten if a subsidiary is available, for, by recent Tax Court
construction, the section does not apply to a subsidiary corporation's purchase
of its parent's stock from the parent's owners.24 Therefore, until the law is
changed,2 5 stockholders of a parent corporation may convert their interests in
corporate earnings into cash at will by simple sales of stock to the subsidiary.
These sales may be made without regard to the presence or absence of a shrink-
age in the corporate activities of either parent or subsidiary and with no change
in the stockholders' proportionate interests in the parent. And their receipts
will be partly taxable at capital gains rates and partly untaxed at the time.
Moreover, the untaxed portion, which reduces the basis of the stockholder's
remaining shares, need never be subjected to an income tax unless the parent
corporation is forced to liquidate.2 6 The possible removal of the parent-sub-
sidiary gap in Section 1i5(g) suggests a similar, but perhaps less vulnerable,
avoidance system. If entirely separate corporations are owned in substantially
the same proportions by identical stockholders, either corporation may purchase
a given fraction of the holdings of each stockholder in the other corporation
without coming within Section 115(g). The stockholders may thus indefinitely
withdraw the profits of both corporations without dividend taxation. Although
this plan may frequently be impractical, and although it might be checked by
judicial maneuvering,7 it again implies: (i) that there will always be a lag be-
tween taxpayers' avoidance plans and judicial avoidance-prevention doctrines,
and consequently ever-present avoidance, until the Code is basically changed;
23 If the basic premises require further examination, suppose A invests $r,ooo in the A
Corp. on the same day B invests $i,ooo in the B Corp. After five years, the A Corp., with ac-
cumulated profits of which A's pro rata share is $x,ooo, terminates half its operations and
partially liquidates, redeeming one-half A's stock for which A is distributed $i,ooo. At the
same time the B Corp., with accumulated profits in which B's proportionate interest is $i,ooo,
distributes cash dividends, of which $i,ooo go to B. A has a long-term capital gain of $250 and
the basis of his remaining shares is $500. B has ordinary income of $i,ooo and the basis of his
shares remains $i,ooo. If both corporationslater completely liquidate without further earnings
or losses, A has another long-term capital gain of $250, while B has no taxable gain. If both
corporations continue operations with equal success, so that A's shares have the same market
value at his death as have B's at his decease, the respective successors of each begin their owner-
ship with the same bases.
,4 Trustees Common Stock John Wanamaker Philadelphia, zi T.C. 365 (1948). The section
reads: "If a corporation cancels or redeems its stock.. . ." The court relied on the words "its
stock."
2S Congressional change is suggested by the Tax Court "[i]f we are mistaken in our view of
[Section iis(g)'s scope. . . ." Ibid. Judicial change is suggested by the Commissioner's an-
nouncement of nonacquiescence. Internal Revenue Bulletin 1949-7, 5 C.C.H. Fed. Tax Rep.
61o3 (1949).
26 1nt. Rev. Code § ii3(a)(5), 26 U.S.C.A. § 1i3(a)(5) (1945).
27 Compare Lehman v. Comm'r, 109 F. 2d 99 (C.C.A. 2d, i94o), cert. den. 31o U.S. 637
(194o) (reciprocal trusts).
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and (2) that the basic discrepancy between the tax on a sale of shares and the tax
on a dividend must be removed before substantial fairness can be attained, for
the plan described would achieve its effectiveness because of its similarity to an
ordinary sale of stock by the shareholders.
If a corporation reduces the par value of each of its shares by, for instance,
fifty per cent and distributes the amount of the reduction to the shareholders,
the effect on a shareholder (or on the corporation) is very difficult to distinguish
from that resulting if the corporation redeems one-half its shares pro rata from
its stockholders at par value. However, the shareholder may find that there is a
considerable distinction between these two transactions when he pays his in-
come tax. The distribution from "reduction surplus" will be wholly taxable as a
dividend, whether or not the reduction of par was accompanied by or resulted
from a contraction in business.28 The stock redemption distribution will be
taxed as a capital gain and only to the extent that it exceeds the basis of the
stock turned in, if it qualifies as a partial liquidation by reason of a correspond-
ing shrinkage in the activities of the corporate enterprise2 9 The attempt to
draw a line between shareholder receipts resembling cash dividends and receipts
resembling those from the sale of stock is here reduced to a narrow difference in
formalities.3o
Contrasting tax consequences in transactions with the same nontax effect
may of course appear in loss situations as well as in circumstances in which the
investment is profitable. A comparison of partial liquidations and recapitaliza-
tions involving cash payments to shareholders will furnish an example. If the
stockholder exchanges shares with the corporation, trading ten no-par shares
which cost him $Uoo each for five $io par shares worth $17 each and $85 in cash,
the transaction will probably be considered a recapitalization, and no loss will be
recognized to the shareholder.S' If, instead of exchanging shares, he turns in five
29 Sheehan v. Dana, z63 F. 2d 316 (C.C.A. 8th, i947); Beretta v. Comm'r, 143 F. 2d 452
(C.C.A. 5th, I944), cert. den. 323 U.S. 720 (1944); see R.D. Merrill Co., 4T.C. 955, 967 (1945).
There will, of course, be no dividend tax if the reduction in par is one of a series of such reduc-
tions constituting a complete liquidation of the enterprise. R. D. Merrill Co., 4 T.C. 955,
963-71 (1945).
29 Joseph W. Imler, ii T.C. 836 (1948); Samuel A. Upham, 4 T.C. 1120 (1945).
30 Compare cases cited note 28 supra with cases cited note 29 supra. In each of these cases
there was no change in the proportionate interests of the stockholders; in each of them there
was a definite termination of a substantial part of the corporation's business. In the Beretta
opinion (a reduction of par case) the court said: "A corporation may not completely avoid tax
consequences to its stockholders by declaring a stock dividend out of profits in one year, later
reducing its capital stock by the amount of such stock dividend, and then distributing, as capi-
tal assets, these profits under the guise of a partial liquidation." Beretta v. Comm'r, 41 F. 2d
452, 455-56 (C.C.A. 5th, z944). But it appears that precisely this could have been done if the
corporation had only collected a few pieces of paper from the stockholders. Cases cited note 29
supra; authorities cited note 22 supra. Even this distinction is usually not present since new
share certificates reflecting the change in par value will ordinarily be issued, the old certificates
being turned in.
31 Spirella Co. v. Comm'r, 155 F. 2d 908 (C.C.A. 2d, 1946); Int. Rev. Code §§ II2(b)(3),
112(g)(I)(E), I12(e), 26 U.S.C.A. §§ ii2(b)(3 ), I12(g)(I)(E), I12(e) (i945). If the transaction
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of the no-par shares for retirement and receives $85 in cash, keeping the other
five no-par shares which are now worth $17 each, he will be allowed a capital loss
of $415, since this transaction is a partial liquidation.32 Moreover, if the cor-
poration directors wish to change the remaining shares from no-par to $io par,
this may be done later without tax consequences.33 1f the second step follows or
precedes the liquidation step too closely, the two steps may be consolidated into
one transaction in judicial contemplation.34 Such a decision most clearly spot-
lights the strange distinction, and suggests the significant although perhaps un-
intended influence of the structure of the Code. The lack of correlation between
Section 112 (dealing with exchanges) and Section 115 (dealing with distribu-
tions) is apparent in this and other situations where formal differences in essen-
tially similar transactions place one transaction within the former section and
another within the latter, with strikingly dissimilar tax results. The easily
demonstrated but often overlooked practical identity of some exchanges with
some distributions tends to be obscured by the deceptive separateness of the
relevant Code sections. When a court recognizes the similarities in such instances
the only means of reconciliation of the sections is often a case-to-case technique
like that of the consolidation of two transactions. A broader reconciliation can
be effected by applying the Section ii5 definition of a dividend35 to Section 112
as well as to other parts of Section i15. This method, introduced by the Su-
preme Court,' 6 eliminates some of the inconsistencies, although it introduces
others.37
In profitable investments, recapitalizations in which the shareholder receives
cash again appear unfavorable to him as compared with stock redemptions. If
the corporation has accumulated profits, the stockholder, in a recapitalization,
is held to be a recapitalization within Section ii2(g)(i)(E), and therefore a reorganization
within Section 112(b)( 3 ), no loss will be recognized even though "boot" is included in the
exchange, under Section 112(e).
31Malone v. Comm'r, 128 F. 2d 967 (C.C.A. 5th, 1942); Kelly v. Comm'r, 97 F. 2d 915
(C.C.A. 2d, 1938). In the Malone case the redemption price per share was less than market
value, but the court did not think the artificial nature of the loss was a valid objection to the
partial liquidation conclusion.
331nt. Rev. Code §i12(b)(2), 26 U.S.C.A. §12(b)(2) (2945); Treas. Reg. iii,
§ 29. I12(b)(2)-I (1946).
34 Spirella Co. v. Comm'r, 155 F. 2d 9o8 (C.C.A. 2d, 1946). The contrasting results in the
cases described in the text are significant even though the stockholder who takes the capital
loss in the partial liquidation must make a corresponding basis adjustment, since he has an
advantage in timing which is especially important in view of the limitation on capital loss
allowance. Int. Rev. Code § II7(d)(2), 26 U.S.C.A. § 117(d)(2) (I945). Moreover, he might
otherwise lose entirely the benefit of this capital loss. Int. Rev. Code § 113(a)(5), 26 U.S.C.A.
§ 113(a)(5) (1945).
3SInt. Rev. Code § 115(a), 26 U.S.C.A. § i15(a) (i945).
36 Comm'r v. Estate of Bedford, 325 U.S. 283, 291-92 (1945).
37 For example, the inconsistency described in text at notes 38-43 infra.
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will probably receive property worth more than the cost of his old shares. This
gain will be recognized to the extent that he receives money38 in the exchange. 39
The amount of gain recognized will nearly always be taxed as a dividend.4o On
the other hand, the money received in a partial liquidation, with no accompany-
ing exchange of shares for shares, will be partly taxed as a capital gain and partly
accounted for as an adjustment of basis,41 unless the redemption is held subject
to Section 115(g).42 The shallow foundation for this tax distinction is empha-
sized by analogous cases in which the stockholders, wishing to discontinue a
part of the business of their corporation, could have turned in a comparable part
of their stock, their consequent realization of corporate profits being taxed as a
capital gain on a distribution in partial liquidation. Instead, they caused the
corporation to exchange a part of its assets for the stock of a new corporation,
and then completely liquidated the old corporation. These two transactions
were considered by the court to be a single integrated proceeding which was
held to be a reorganization, and the realization of corporate earnings was taxed
as a dividend.43 However, the tax distinction between partial liquidations and
recapitalizations described above may disappear. The leading case taxing the
"boot" received in a recapitalization as a dividend44 has been followed by sug-
gestions of judicial inclination to tax every distribution in partial liquidation as
38 Or other property not permitted by Section 1 12(b)( 3) to be received without recognition
of gain.
39 Int. Rev. Code § I12(c)(1), 26 U.S.C.A. § i12(c)(I) (i945).
4o Comm'r v. Estate of Bedford, 325 U.S. 283 (1945); Int. Rev. Code § 112(c)(2), 26
U.S.C.A. § z12(c)(2) (ig4s); cf. Estate of Elise W. Hill, io T.C. iogo (1948) (reorganization
involving two corporations). The language of the Court in the Bedford case seems to make
every money distribution of earnings in a recapitalization (or other reorganization) taxable as
a dividend to the extent of the gain recognized in Section 112(c)(i). Thus, "we hold thata dis-
tribution, pursuant to a reorganization, of earnings and profits 'has the effect of a distribution
of a taxable dividend' within § Ix2(c)(2)." Comm'r v. Estate of Bedford, supra, at 292. How-
ever, it has been suggested that this language was broader than necessary or intended, and
that it should be limited by the words of Section 112(c)(2) which, if the distribution "has the
effect of a distribution of a taxable dividend," tax as a dividend "such an amount of the gain
recognized under [Section 112(c)(i)] as is not in excess of [the distributee's] ratable share of the
undistributed earnings and profits of the corporation accumulated after February 28, 1913."
(Italics added.) Thus, if a preferred stockholder exchanges his 5% preferred share with a $iio
liquidation preference for a 4% preferred share with a $ioo liquidation preference and $xo
cash, there being no dividend arrearages on the old shares, the cash is paid to compensate for
the reduction in dividend and liquidation preferences. The cash received might be considered
to be"in excess of [the stockholder's] ratable share" of earnings, since the preferred stockholder
whose dividends have been paid may be said to have no ratable share in the corporate earnings.
Darrell, The Scope of Commissioner v. Bedford Estate, 24 Taxes 266 (1946).
4 "'[A]mounts distributed in partial liquidation of a corporation shall be treated as in part or
full payment in exchange for the stock." Int. Rev. Code § IX5(c), 26 U.S.C.A. § ii5(c) (i945).
42 Authorities cited notes 20-22 supra.
43 Lewis v. Comm'r, 176 F. 2d 646 (C.A. ist, 1949); Estate of Elise W. Hill, io T.C. logo
(1948).
44 Comm'r v. Estate of Bedford, 325 U.S. 283 (I945).
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a dividend to the extent of the accumulated corporate earnings.45 But this result
hardly seems proper as a matter of interpretation of the present statute,46 and
the distinction still remains.47
All of the transactions so far discussed involved one-step realizations of cash
by the stockholder. If a recapitalization does not include a money distribution, a
second step is required if the shareholder is to convert his interest in corporate
profits into cash. A shareholder in a corporation with widely owned stock can, of
course, realize the increment in his investment as a capital gain through a sale
of his stock, and he may repurchase similar shares later if he desires. In a cor-
poration with only closely held common shares outstanding, however, the stock-
holder may be unable to market his stock at its real value; moreover, he may not
wish to disturb his proportionate interest in the enterprise. The sale of bonds by
the shareholder would avoid or lessen both these objections. A dividend in bonds
has long been taxable to the stockholder at the market value of the bonds;45 so
recapitalizations involving an exchange of common for bonds have been used to
provide stockholders in closely held corporations with bonds to sell and a conse-
quent opportunity to realize on accumulated corporate earnings at capital gain
rates. Such a recapitalization is within the terms of the reorganization non-
recognition provisions, falling under Section I 12 (b) (3) .49 These provisions were
intended to eliminate tax barriers to economically desirable changes in cor-
4 See Kirschenbaum v. Comm'r, i55 F. 2d 23, 24 (C.C.A. 2d, x946), cert. den. 329 U.S. 726
(1946); but cf. Comm'rv. Snite, 177 F. 2d 8rg (C.A. 7th, x949). This tendency, to applySection
iis(g) to partial liquidations in the same manner as Section 112(c)(2) isapplied to recapitali-
zation distributions, is furthered by the frequent statement that the net effect of the distribu-
tion is the criterion for Section iIs(g) application. See, for example, Smith v. United States,
121 F. 2d 692, 695-96 (C.C.A. 3d, i941).
46 So broad an application of Section iis(g) would render parts of Section iis(c) practically
meaningless.
47 No gain is recognized in an exchange of common stock solely for common stock in the
same corporation, or in an exchange of preferred solely for preferred in the same corporation,
apart from recapitalizations. Int. Rev. Code § 112(b)(2), 26 U.S.C.A. § Ir2(b)(2) (i945). If
money or other property is also received in the exchange, gain is recognized to the extent of the
sum of the money and the fair market value of the other property. Int. Rev. Code § 112(c) (I),
26 U.S.C.A. § i12(c)(I) (1945). But Section 112(c)(2), which usually (always?) taxes as a
dividend all of the gain so recognized in the case of recapitalizations and other reorganizations
(as discussed in the text and note 40 supra) so long as the gain is received from accumulated
earnings, is expressly applicable only to reorganization exchanges and impliedly inapplicable to
Section 112(b)(2) exchanges. Is the gain received in money in a Section 112(b)(2) exchange
always a capital gain and never taxable as a dividend? Why would this result not apply to the
reduction of par cases cited in note 28 supra?
48 Doerschuck v. United States, 274 Fed. 739 (D.C.N.Y., 2921).
49Int. Rev. Code §§ 112(b)( 3), 112(g)(x)(E), 26 U.S.C.A. §§ II2(b)(3), 112(g)(I)(E)(2945). Although Section 112(b)(3) is headed "Stock for stock on reorganization," the section
itself states: "No gain or loss shall be recognized if stock or securities ... are ... exchanged
solely for stock or securities.... ." Ibid. Exchanges of bonds for bonds have been held to be
within this section. Comm'r v. Neustadt's Trust, 131 F. 2d 528 (C.C.A. 2d, 1942); Jeanne G.
Miller, 3 T.C.M. 230 (x944); cf. Treas. Reg. iii, § 29.i12(g)-2 (1946) (preferred for bonds
given as example of recapitalization).
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porate capital structures by preventing recognition of "paper profits" in neces-
sary business adjustments.So However, the provisions have been extensively
used for avoidance, including avoidance of dividend taxation by realization of
corporation earnings as capital gains. As a result, the courts have superimposed
requirements beyond those expressed by the statute on transactions for which
taxpayers seek immunity under Section i12(b) (3), s including the requirement
that the transaction must have served a business purpose. The requisite business
purpose has been held to be a corporate business purpose' The meaning of "cor-
porate business purpose" has never been entirely clear, but the concept appar-
ently requires that a recapitalization benefit the corporate enterprise, apart
from the stockholders, in ways unrelated to tax considerations, if the share-
holder is to escape taxation of his gain on the exchange.5 3 The "corporate" refine-
ment has been vanishing since the Supreme Court decision in Bazley v.
Comrn'r,S4 so it is probably no longer necessary to be concerned with this subtlety
in the business-purpose concept. In that decision, the shareholder's gain in a
recapitalization exchange of common stock for bonds was held taxable as a divi-
dend,55 in an opinion which implied that in any reorganization having an effect
equivalent to a distribution of earnings the stockholder may be held to be the
soS. Rep. 617, 65th Cong. 3d Sess., at 5-6 (I918); S. Rep. 275, 67th Cong. istSess., at 11-12
(1921); H. R. DOC. 704, 73d Cong. 2d Sess., at 13-14 (g.34); S. Rep. 558, 73 d Cong. 2d Sess.,
at 16-17 (I934).
s, The requirement of a continuity of proprietary interest on the part of the taxpayer after
the exchange has been applied in reorganizations involving more than one corporation. Pinellas
Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Comm'r, 287 U.S. 462 (1933); Le Tulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415
(1940); Int. Rev. Code §§ ii2(g)(i)(B), I12(g)(I)(C), 26 U.S.C.A. §§ X12(g)(i)(B),
112(g)(I)(C) (1945). This test has not (yet) been introduced into the recapitalization field.
Clarence J. Schoo, 47 B.T.A. 459 (1942).
S2 The business-purpose requirement originated in Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465
(I935). It has been applied to recapitalizations in cases requiring direct business advantage to
the corporation as opposed to benefits to the stockholders. Adam A. Adams, 5 T.C. 35x (I945),
aff'd 155 F. 2d 246 (C.C.A. 3d, 1946), aff'd 331 U.S. 737 (1947); Alice H. Bazley, 4 T.C. 897
(1945), aff'd z55 F. 2d 237 (C.C.A. 3 d, 1946), aff'd 331 U.S. 737 (1947); Marjorie N. Dean,
io T.C. 19 (1948); Louis Wellhouse, 3 T.C. 363 (1944).
53 Cases cited note 52 supra. There is "no reliable definition of corporate business pur-
pose.... [In any case where the court feels that it should hold that there has been a reorgani-
zation, there is a corporate purpose; and in any case where the court feels that it should hold no
reorganization, corporate purpose is lacking." Ivins, The Business Purpose Rule in Corporate
Recapitalization, in New York University Seventh Annual Institute on Federal Taxation 1161,
1165 (1949). See Spear, "Corporate Business Purpose" in Reorganization, 3 Tax L. Rev. 225
(I947)-
5" 331 U.S. 737 (1947). The corporate business-purpose requirement was expressly repudi-
ated in Lewis v. Comm'r, 176 F. 2d 646 (C.A. ist, 1949). The Tax Court's retreat from
the refinement was not so obvious, but nevertheless clear. Estate of John B. Lewis, io T.C.
io8o (1948); Estate of Elise W. Hill, io T.C. 1090 (1948).
ss One thousand $ioo par shares had been exchanged for five thousand no-par shares and
callable ten year debenture bonds with a face value of $4ooooo. Bazley v. Comnm'r, 33i U.S.
737 (i947).
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recipient of a taxable dividend.s6 The Court made little mention of the lack of
corporate business purpose in the transactions in the Bazley case.S7 The broad
language employed in the opinion could be interpreted to establish a new test-
equivalence to a taxable dividend s5 If that is now the test, the shareholder's
gain on a recapitalization exchange will be taxed as a dividend to the extent
that the securities received would have been so taxed if there had been no ex-
change, but only a distribution of the securities. Whether or not the business-
purpose test is obsolete in the recapitalization field, there is little doubt as to
the general direction of the decision or as to its effect on bonds in recapitaliza-
tions. The same decision impliedily held that bonds, or at least callable bonds,
are not "securities" within the meaning of the reorganization nonrecognition
provisions.s9
With bonds understandably unpopular as securities for which to exchange
common stock in recapitalizations when-the corporation has accumulated earn-
ings, preferred stock has assumed new importance. The issuance of preferred
stock in exchange for common stock has been held to come within the recapitali-
zation provisions, with neither a taxable dividend nor recognized capital gain
resulting to the stockholder.6 ° Under the present decisions, aside from the pos-
sible implications of the Supreme Court's holding in the Bazley case, a business
purpose will prevent the recognition of gain on such an exchange. 6' Even though
s6Bazley v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. 737, 740-43 (1947); Adams v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. 737, 744
('947).
s7 Ibid.
ss Heady v. Comm'r, 162 F. 2d 699 (C.C.A. 7th, 1947); Ivins, The Business Purpose Rule in
Corporate Recapitalization, in New York University Seventh Annual Institute on Federal
Taxation ii61, 1166-67 (i949); Platt, Preferred Stock Dividends and Recapitalizations After
the Bazley and Adams Cases, in New York University Seventh Annual Institute on Federal
Taxation 56i, 563-64 (1949). But cf. Marjorie N. Dean, io T.C. 19 (1948).
s9 Bazley v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. 737, 743 (1947): "And even if this transaction were deemed a
reorganization, the facts would equally sustain the imposition of the tax on the debentures
under § 112(C)(1), and (2). Commissioner v. Bedford. . . ." If the bonds were subject to tax
under Section I2(c)(2), the Court must have considered them property not permitted by
Section 1 12(b) (3) to be received without the recognition of gain, and therefore not securities
within the meaning of thelatter section. The Court had referred to the fact that the bonds were
callable at the will of the corporation which was the will of the taxpayer, the corporation being
entirely owned by a husband and wife. Hence the implied exclusion of bonds from the def-
inition, of "securities" is perhaps limited to the facts present in the Bazley case. Compare
cases cited note 49 supra. The Bedford case is discussed in note 40 supra.
6o Bass v. Comm'r, 129 F. 2d 300 (C.C.A. ist, 1942) (Commissioner's attempt to tax pre-
ferred as stock dividend defeated); Marjorie N. Dean, io T.C. Ig (1948) (corporate business
purpose prevented recognition of gain); Louis Wellhouse, 3 T.C. 363 (1944). The Bass case
was not very strict in requiring a corporate business purpose, and it is probably no longer the
law, particularly in view of the cases cited at note 56 supra.
61 Cases cited note 52 supra. The only later decision in point distinguished the Bazley case
on the grounds that no bonds were involved, the taxpayers did not retain any common stock,
and the distribution was not pro rata among the stockholders. Several stockholders did not
participate in the exchange. Marjorie N. Dean, io T.C. I9 (1948).
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the test of equivalence to a taxable dividend is applied as a result of the Bazley
decision, a recapitalization exchange of common for preferred will not necessar-
ily be taxed, in the absence of additional circumstances indicating avoidance,
since a dividend in preferred on common would not necessarily be a taxable
dividend.62 However, since the Bazley decision, the Treasury has indicated that
it may attack transactions in which preferred stock is acquired by the common
stockholder without tax consequences and then sold or redeemed.13 The govern-
ment's chances of success in the courts in this endeavor are problematical,4 as
are possibilities of legislative clarification. 6s
The mechanics of the preferred stock method of realization of corporate earn-
ings as capital gains vary. The preferred may be issued in exchange for a part of
the stockholder's common in a recapitalization or as a stock dividend on com-
mon. The preferred may then be sold, redeemed, or sold and redeemed from
the purchaser. Where the stock dividend or recapitalization and the sale, re-
demption, or sale and redemption are close in time and obviously interdepend-
ent, they are subject to judicial integration into one transaction to be taxed as a
dividend, especially since the Bazley case. Deliberately planned "bail-outs" with
manifest avoidance purposes may thus be set apart from the main trends. Apart
from these situations, if the preferred is issued as a stock dividend, no showing
of business purpose is required to escape taxation of the dividend, and, under
the Strassburger decision, it will be taxed only if there is preferred previously
outstanding.6 If the preferred stock issuance is part of a recapitalization, where
a sufficient business purpose can be found it will be immune from dividend taxa-
tion, unless the Bazley case establishes a new doctrine for recapitalizations. If
that decision does make equivalence to a taxable dividend the test for recapitali-
zations,67 issuances of preferred in recapitalizations will be judged according to
the Strassburger case. Thus when the stockholder exchanges common for com-
mon and preferred in a recapitalization, the preferred received will not be
equivalent to a taxable dividend, as defined by the Strassburger decision, unless
other preferred-is previously outstanding. Both methods are therefore equally
6Strassburger v. Comm'r, 318 U.S. 6o4 (1943).
63 Darrell, Recent Developments in Nontaxable Reorganizations and Stock Dividends, 6i
Harv. L. Rev. o58 (1948); DeWind, Preferred Stock "Bail-Outs" and the Income Tax, 62
Harv. L. Rev. 1126, 1132-35 (949)
64 Possible approaches in attempts to tax such transactions are analyzed in Platt, Preferred
Stock Dividends and Recapitalizations After the Bazley and Adams Cases, in New York
University Seventh Annual Institute on Federal Taxation 561 (1949); and in authorities cited
note 63 supra.
65 Recent proposals for congressional action tend toward greater exemption and more con-
fusion. For example: H. R. Doc. 523, 8oth Cong. 2d Sess., at 22 (1947).
66 A livilenl in preferred on common, with only common previously outstanding, was held
not taxable in Strassburger v. Comm'r, 3 i8 U.S. 604 (1943). The business-purpose requirement
has never appeared in stock dividend cases.
6 Authorities cited note 58 supra.
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protected by the Strassburger case,68 a decision unusually vulnerable to discard, 9
but nevertheless representing settled statutory construction. The Treasury's
opportunities for dividend taxation at redemption are equally problematical.
If the preferred is redeemed from the original recipient, the redemption will
probably be taxed under Section 115(g),70 but if it -is redeemed from a pur-
chaser, the redemption will probably not be subject to that section.7, Therefore,
aside from obvious "bail-outs," and in the absence of congressional change or a
considerable change in interpretation of present statutes, it is still possible for
common stockholders to achieve the effect of a cash dividend in two steps with-
out any corporate liquidation, complete or partial, and without dividend taxa-
tion.
It has already been suggested that stock dividends are not subject to the
business-purpose requirement, so that a stock dividend in preferred on common
may be a more convenient first step than a recapitalization in any attempt to
transfer earnings to the stockholder without a dividend tax and without dis-
turbing his interest in the corporation. Under present law, a stock dividend is
taxable if it alters the shareholder's pre-existing proportionate interest in the
assets of the corporation-that is, his rights upon liquidation and his rights to
dividends.72 Accordingly, where both preferred and common stock are outstand-
68 Text at note 62 supra.
69 The Strassburger case was a five to three decision, which might be distinguished on the
ground that it involved a corporation with only one stockholder. Several cogent arguments are
given for overruling the decision in DeWind, op. cit. supra note 63, at 1142-54. If the case is
overruled or its authority confined to one-man corporations, stockholders who were fortunate
enough to have included preferred stock in the capital structure of their corporation at or-
ganization, and to have taken both common and preferred rather than only common, would
still be able to turn their interests in corporate earnings into cash without being taxed as divi-
dend recipients and without loss of control. This is now the case in corporations which origi-
nally issued bonds and common to the sa me investors. Thus the Bazley decision and its possible
successors only shift the comparative inequity and place a premium on complex capital struc-
tures in closely held corporations.
70 Authorities cited notes i8 and 21 supra.
71 All of the purchaser's shares will probably be redeemed at one time. The Regulations
exempt shareholders whose stock is completely redeemed from Section x15(g). Treas. Reg. iii,
§ 29. I15-9 (x946). Even if the purchaser redeemed only a part of his shares, the section might
not be applied, since some cases have held purchasers not subject to its provisions. However,
most courtswould probably not distinguish purchasers from original shareholders in this con-
nection. Shelby H. Curlee, 28 B.T.A. 773 (1933), aff'd sub nom. Randolph v. Comm'r, 76 F. 2d
472 (C.C.A. 8th, I935), cert. den. 296 U.S. 599 (1935); cf. United National Corp., 2 T.C. Iii,
123 (1943). But cf. Parker v. United States, 88 F. 2d 907 (C.C.A. 7 th, 1937).
72 A careful and comprehensive analysis of the cases and the proportionate-interest test may
be found in Rottschaefer, Present Taxable Status of Stock Dividends in Federal Law, 28 Minn.
L. Rev. IO6 (1944). A change in voting rights with no change in rights to dividends or rights on
liquidation might be a sufficient change in proportionate interests to make a stock dividend
taxable. It probably is not-no cases raise the point-and it hardly should be. Ibid., at 128.
But see Lowndes, The Taxation of Stock Dividends and Stock Rights, 96 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 147,
150 (i947).
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ing prior to the dividend, a dividend in common on common is exempt, 3 while
dividends in preferred on common,74 common on preferred, 75 or preferred on pre-
ferred 76 are generally" taxable. If only common stock is previously outstanding,
a dividend in preferred is not taxable. 8 The questionable character of the dis-
tinction between nontaxable stock dividends and taxable stock dividends has
been pointed out elsewhere.9 The unwarranted difference in treatment be-
tween nontaxable stock dividends and recapitalizations, represented by the
"3 Compare Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 37X (1943) (common on common with only
common outstanding); Helvering v. Sprouse, 318 U.S. 6o4 (1943) (nonvoting common on vot-
ing common and nonvoting common with no other outstanding); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S.
189 (1920) (common on common with only common outstanding); Benjamin Josephson, 6
T.C.M. 788 (947) (same). The statement in the text is subject to the qualification that where
the outstanding preferred is participating as to dividends or assets on liquidation, a dividend in
common on common would increase the proportionate interests of the common stockholders at
the expense of the preferred shareholders, and therefore probably be taxable.
74 Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238 (1937); Helvering v. Pfeiffer, 302 U.S. 247 (1937). The
refinements of the proportionate-interest test again require qualification of the general state-
ment in the text. Thus, a stock dividend in junior preferred on common where only senior pre-
ferred and common were previously outstanding does not alter the proportionate interests of
the shareholders, and is not taxable. Compare Bureau Letter, December 3, 1948, 5 C.C.H.
Fed. Tax Rep. 8731 (1949) (stock rights). But cf. Choate v. Comm'r, 129 F. 2d 684 (C.C.A.
2d, 1942) (prior to Helvering v. Sprouse).
Stock rights are taxed under the same basic principles as stock dividends, the proportionate-
interest test applying. Miles v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 259 U.S. 247 (1922); Charles M.
Cooke, Ltd., 2 T.C. 147 (1943); Int. Rev. Code § rII(f)(I), 26 U.S.C.A. § iI 5 (f)(i) (945);
Treas. Reg. 11, § 29.1x5-7 (1946). However, the contingent nature of stock rights has re-
sulted in unnecessary complexities. Gibson v. Comm'r, 133 F. 2d 308 (C.C.A. 2d, 1943); Choate
v. Comm'r, 129 F. 2d 684 (C.C.A. 2d, 1942); Lowndes, op. cit. supra note 72, at 157-70; cf.
Palmer v. Comm'r, 302 U.S. 63 (1937) (rights to purchase shares of another corporation).
7s Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441 (1936). This case commenced the retreat from Eisner
v. MNacomber, or, as you will, the clarification of the principles embodied in Eisner v. Macom-
ber. The Macomber case involved dividends in common on common with no other class of
stock outstanding, and held that such dividends are not constitutionally taxable as income.
The Koshland decision was the first of a series of cases which ended with these results: (i)
Stock dividends are not taxable to the extent that they are not income within the Sixteenth
Amendment as construed up to the time of the enactment of Section i15(f)(i) of the Revenue
Act of 1936. That construction embodies the proportionate-interest test. Helvering v. Grif-
fiths, 318 U.S. 371 (943); Int. Rev. Code § II(f)(i), 26 U.S.C.A. § 115(f)(1) (945);
Rottschaefer, Present Taxable Status of Stock Dividends in Federal Law, 28 Minn. L. Rev.
io6, x63 (i944). (2) Eisner v. Macomber will probably be overruled on the constitutional issue
on the first opportunity. Rottschaefer, supra at 192; Lowndes, op. cit. supra note 72, at 149
(i947). The history of the cases is recounted in Magill, Taxable Income 30-58 (1945).
76 Helms Bakeries, 46 B.T.A. 308 (1942).
77 There is no change in proportionate interests and consequently no taxable dividend in
any of these cases if all classes of stock outstanding are each held in the same proportions by
the same people, and the new stock is issued pro rata.
78 Strassburger v. Comm'r, 318 U.S. 604 (1943); cf. Charles M. Cooke, Ltd., 2 T.C. 147
0943) (stock rights).
"9 Lowndes, The Taxation of Stock Dividends and Stock Rights, 96 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 147
(1947). "There is some sense in not taxing any stock dividends as income. There is a lot of
sense in taxing all stock dividends as income. There is little save nonsense in taxing some stock
dividends and not taxing others." Ibid., at 155.
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business-purpose requirement, may be disappearing.8° It is not entirely unrea-
sonable to make another comparison, contrasting the tax results in the case of
the recipient of a dividend in common on common with those in the case of a
stockholder who has reinvested his cash dividend in the same or a similar enter-
prise. When these transactions have been completed, the two shareholders may
be in equivalent positions in all respects but one. They may own similar stock of
identical par and book value in practically identical enterprises, and their net
withdrawals of cash from their investments may be equal; but the cash divi-
dend recipient will be taxed on his dividend, while the one who receives the
stock dividend will not be subject to any tax.8'
The proportionate-interest test for stock dividends does not apply to trans-
actions under Section 112(b)(2), which provides for the nonrecognition of gain
in exchanges of common for common and preferred for preferred.12 At the same
time, the capitalization of surplus will not take such an exchange out of Section
112(b)(2). Thus if preferred shareholders whose dividends are in arrears are
issued a preferred stock dividend in satisfaction of the accumulated arrearages,
they will be taxed on the market value of the new stock received under the pro-
portionate-interest test.83 If, instead, they exchange each old share for one and
a half new preferred shares, they will probably avoid recognition of gain, not to
mention a dividend tax. 84 Indeed, if the transaction meets the business-purpose
requirement, they can exchange their rights to unpaid cumulative dividends for
common stock in a recapitalization with no probable tax consequences. 85 But a
dividend in common on preferred would be taxable.86 A further illustration of
the results of the application of differing standards to transactions which may
produce the same economic effect is provided by a comparison of Section
112(b)(2) exchanges and recapitalizations. The former type of exchange does
not seem to be subject to the requirement of a business advantage to the cor-
poration.5 7 This furnishes opportunities for maneuvering which may become
8o Text at notes 56-58 supra.
81 Is the difference in results justified merely because the cash dividend recipient has for an
interval separated his money from the hazards of the enterprise?
82Int. Rev. Code § 112(b)(2), 26 U.S.C.A. )§ I2(b)(2) (1945); Treas. Reg. iii,
§ 29.112(b)(2)-I (1946).
8
3 Helms Bakeries, 46 B.T.A. 308 (1942).
84 Skenandoa Rayon Corp. v. Comm'r, 122 F. 2d 268 (C.C.A. 2d, 1941), cert. den. 314 U.S.
696 (x941); cf. Okonite Co., 4 T.C. 618, 63o-33 (1945), aff'd 155 F. 2d 248 (C.C.A. 3d, 1946),
cert. den. 329 U.S. 764 (1946) (non recognition recapitalization).
8s Knapp Monarch Co., i T.C. 59 (1942), aff'd I39 F. 2d 863 (C.C.A. 8th, 1944). Again, the
possible effects of the Bazley case on such an exchange should be considered. Authorities cited
notes 56 and 58 supra.
86 Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 44I (1936).
87 No case has been found in which the business-purpose test has been applied to a Section
112(b) (2) exchange. But cf. Comm'r v. Transport Trading and Terminal Corp., 176 F. 2d 570
(C.A. 2d, 1949) (Gregory doctrine applicable to Section 115).
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more important if the expected Treasury campaign against exchanges of com-
mon for preferred meets with success. 8
Transactions involving two steps in the conversion of accumulated corporate
profits into cash in the stockholder's bank account are always subject to being
judicially treated as one, with a resultant failure to achieve the intended tax
result, if they are clearly interdependent.9 This process will defeat only some of
the more patent tax avoidance schemes, however, and the truth remains that
widely different tax results accompany undiffering economic consequences in
many shareholder realizations of corporate earnings. This is the case in trans-
actions involving two steps, as well as in more direct realizations. Tax avoidance
is not only possible, but often not very difcult and usually well worth the cost.90
Inequity is not only widespread, but inherent from the beginning in the taxation
of stockholders' receipts. The comparisons made here are by no means exhaus-
tive in their description of inequities and avoidance opportunities.
The sale of stock is perhaps the most important means of transforming an
undivided interest in corporate profits into cash without incurring a dividend
tax. Recapitalizations have been significant in stockholders' avoidance largely
as a means of providing stockholders with saleable securities or with securities
which could be sold without loss of control. This may lead to these questions:
Even though a particular stockholder does avoid dividend taxation by selling all
or part of his stock, will not the buyer necessarily be required to make up the
difference in taxes higher than he otherwise would have paid? Is not final and
total collection by the government inevitable? If this were true, it could well be
objected that the taxpayer receiving the profits should be the one to pay the
full tax thereon. However, the questions may be answered directly: "No." The
buyer will incur no tax liability in converting into cash the interest in accumu-
lated corporate earnings which he purchased from his predecessor, unless the
88 As to the Treasury policy, see authorities cited notes 63 and 64 supra. One Treasury ruling
suggests an inclination to attempt to tax the issuance of sinking fund preferred to common
stockholders as a stock dividend or in a recapitalization exchange. Darrell, op. cit. supra note
63, at 963. Unless the proportionate-interest test is to be abrogated and the Strassburger case
overruled (note 69 supra), this will require a distinction to be drawn between sinking fund pre-
ferred and ordinary preferred. But the effect of that means of attack would be negligible so long
as ordinary preferred could be issued without taxation and then exchanged for sinking fund
preferred without recognition of gain via Section 112 (b) (2). Again, if all means of issuing pre-
ferred to common shareholders tax-free were eliminated, Section I12(b)(2) suggests the tax-
free transfer of nonvoting common to the voting common holders. If the nonvoting common
could be marketed, the original stockholders could still realize corporate earnings as capital
gains without loss of control. Other possibilities of the use of the section for avoidance can be
imagined; the chief doubt in these matters arises from the paucity of authority construing the
section.
89 The process is analyzed in Paul and Zimet, Step Transactions, in Paul, Selected Studies in
Federal Taxation, Second Series 200 (1938).
90 Possible costs include legal advice and litigation expenses, minor nontax disadvantages in
effecting a transaction in a way involving tax advantages, otherwise unnecessary bookkeeping
costs, and the expense of going through a form which would not be required by a more direct
accomplishment of the same result.
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realization is in the form of a cash (or property) dividend.91 The cost of the
stock to the buyer becomes its basis.92 Tax on the buyer's receipts from his in-
vestment will be limited by that basis to the tax on income resulting from cor-
poration profits subsequent to his purchase of the shares, if the receipts are from
resale, from complete or partial liquidation, or in the form of "boot" in a re-
capitalization. 93 The process need never end, unless the buyer is forced to accept
too many cash dividends in lieu of alternative forms of realization.94
judicial lawmakers have long been engaged in plugging loopholes only to
reveal others. Congressional lawmakers have patched the statutes with dozens
of provisions only to create different kinds of inequity. Some unfairness is prob-
ably unavoidable, but gross inconsistencies should not be necessary.95 The cor-
porate earnings situation appears to fall largely into the latter class. judicial
interpretation within the ordinary bounds can have relatively little effect in
remedying the incongruities between tax treatments of transactions. Statutory
change must be broader than usual if it is to avoid further discrepancies.
Conceivable extensions of the Bedford and Bazley cases may tend to draw the
line between dividends and capital adjustments at the same place in several of
the intermediate transactions-that is, between partial liquidations and re-
capitalizations involving "boot," and between stock dividends and recapitaliza-
tions without "boot."96 Or, politically improbable legislation could make all
distributions of earnings in complete and partial liquidations taxable as divi-
dends. This would leave only the transactions culminating in sales open for
shareholder realization of corporate profits as capital gains.97 Even this proposal
would not alter the original comparison between cash dividends and sales of
stock, and the contrasting tax results in those two transactions would take on
great significance in the absence of loopholes by way of the intermediate trans-
actions. 95 Proposals to eliminate the complicating factor of the corporate entity,
91 This analysis does not take into account such factors as the varying value of money and
the effect of general economic conditions of prosperity or depression because these factors are
essentially irrelevant to the inquiry at hand.
92Int. Rev. Code § ii3(a), 26 U.S.C.A. § 13(a) (1945).
93 Int. Rev. Code § 112(c), 26 U.S.C.A. § 112(c) (1945).
94 This unfortunate circumstance will be most likely to occur in the case of widely held cor-
porations, where the stock purchase price will be least likely to have been determined in antici-
pation of its possible occurrence.
95 "Fortuitous minor inequities cannot wholly be excluded; but there must be no opportuni-
ties for deliberate systematic avoidance on a large scale, i.e., for altering substantially one's tax
liabilities without change in one's real income circumstances." Simons, Federal Tax Reform,
14 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 20, 21 (1946).
96 Authorities cited notes 45, 58 and 69 supra.
97 Cash payments to shareholders in recapitalizations, the other transaction not covered by
the suggested legislation, are now largely closed to stockholder realization of corporate earnings
without dividend taxation. Comm'r v. Estate of Bedford, 325 U.S. 283 (1945); note 40 supra.
98 Speculation on the effect of such legislation may bring to mind various evils resulting from
the unnatural influences of a tax system which places such a premium on sales of stock alone,
while it relatively burdens liquidations.
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by taxing corporate owners as though they were partners, are fraught with
tremendous administrative difficulties. Moreover, these proposals would retain
the unfairness of arbitrary fiscal year allocation of income without ultimate and
certain reconciliation of the individual stockholder's tax "realizations" with his
aggregate economic gain or loss on his investment. The only complete solution
seems to be the removal of the sources of the inconsistencies, which are the dis-
crimination between capital gains and ordinary income99 the "unrealized" gain
loophole at death,"°° and the stress on timing created by the fiscal year alloca-
tions of the present system. x0 These changes would of course go far toward
revamping the entire income tax, and they have been ably advocated as part of
such general proposals."°' Reform of this scope is, however, improbable in the
near future.
PATENT POOLING AND THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS
In that broad field where the policies behind the anti-trust laws and the
patent laws clash for supremacy the Supreme Court has for many years moved
to extend the scope of the Sherman Act, at the expense of claimed rights of the
patentee. With the decisions in the Gypsum2 and Line Materials cases early in
1948 this movement reached its farthermost limits to date. But if these decisions
served to tell the patentee what he may not do with his patent, they by no
means left clear the area in which a legal monopoly may be validly exploited.
The first important district court decision to be rendered since those cases
throws a good deal of light on the manner in which the federal courts may be
expected to comply with the pronouncements of the high tribunal, and in addi-
tion opens up some relatively unexplored corners of the anti-trust domain.
United States v. Carboloy4 provides an opportunity to study the manner in
which two patentees, one American and one German, by combining their efforts,
were able to achieve virtually complete domination of a new-born industry and
99 Int. Rev. Code § 117, 26 U.S.C.A. § 117 (1945).
:o Int. Rev. Code § 1i3(a)(S), 26 U.S.C.A. § 113(a)(5) (i945).
lox Simons, op. cit. supra note 95, at 21-23.
x- Simons, PersonalIncome Taxation (X938); Simons, Federal Tax Reform, 14 Univ. Chli. L.
Rev. 20 (1946). The Simons proposals are outlined in Director, Simons on Taxation, 14 Univ.
Chi. L. Rev. 15 (1946). Various proposals are discussed in connection with the corporation in-
come tax in Division of Tax Research, Treasury Dept., The Postwar Corporation Tax Struc-
ture (x946).
1 26 Stat. 209 (i8go), as amended, i5 U.S.C.A. § i (194i).
2 United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (x948).
3 United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948).
4 United States v. General Electric, Carboloy, Krupp, et al., 8o F. Supp. 989 (N.Y., 1948).
This case will hereafter be referred to as United States v. Carboloy, and is to be distinguished
from United States v. General Electric, 82 F. Supp. 753 (N.J., 1949) (incandescent light bulb
monopoly), and United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926) (eading case on
patent price fixing).
